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WHAT DETERMINES THE SUCCESS OF STATES IN THE
SBIR PROGRAM? *
Arno van der Vlist
Shelby Gerking
Henk Folmer
Abstract
This paper analyzes the interstate distribution of awards made through the Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program operated by the U.S federal
government.  The main finding is that awards tend to be made to firms in centers of
innovative activity, where knowledge is most easily created and spillovers between
economic agents can occur most readily.  State programs to assist prospective
applicants for SBIR funding, on the other hand, appear to have had little effect in
overcoming this seemingly powerful factor.  Thus, the percentage distribution of
awards by state has remained roughly constant since the inception of the program.  A
possible implication of these results is that the SBIR program may exacerbate
interstate differences in economic growth to the extent that growth of states is
associated with their ability to create new knowledge.
1. Introduction
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) awards support development of
technology with commercial applications throughout the United States.  This program
is funded by a percentage set-aside from federal agency research budgets and has
provided more than $7 billion for research by U.S. small businesses since 1983.  It is
one of several federal programs that subsidize high-technology firms in the U.S. and is
in some respects similar to related programs in other countries ( Eisinger 1988 and
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1996). Many states, noting
that firms including Apple Computer, Compaq and Intel have received support from
federal programs, promote opportunities in the SBIR program and assist eligible
companies with the application process as part of their economic and technology
development programs.1  Also, federal programs concerned with broadening the
geographic base of U.S. science and engineering such as the Experimental Program to
Stimulate Competitive Research ( EPSCoR) have encouraged this type of support by
states that historically have had comparatively little federal R&D activity.  In spite of
these efforts, however, SBIR awards have remained disproportionately concentrated in
a few states, even after adjusting for the interstate distribution of population.  For
example, California and Massachusetts have consistently received about 40% of SBIR
funding, while states such as Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and
Wyoming have received practically no support from this program.
This paper empirically examines public policies, programs, and state
characteristics that may be expected to influence the geographic distribution of SBIR
awards and represents a contribution to the broader literatures regarding program
evaluation and the effectiveness of state economic development efforts.  A key finding
is that state initiatives to attract funding through this program have had little impact on
the number of awards received and, thus, on the interstate pattern of awards.  Instead,
a better explanation for the geographic distribution of awards is that states with greater
innovative activity, measured by variables including the number of Carnegie Research
1 universities, and the fraction of the population employed as scientists and engineers,
a competitive advantage in the program.  Because innovation and knowledge creation
capacity is positively associated with economic growth ( Romer 1986, Lucas 1988), an
implication of this result is that the SBIR program and related federal technology
development programs may lead to greater interstate disparities in economic growth
rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections.  Section 2
describes the data used to estimate determinants of SBIR success.  Section 3 develops
a fixed effects model for analyzing panel data on the extent to which state programs
were effective in attracting SBIR awards over the period 1983-93.  Section 4 builds on
this analysis to estimate the extent to which variables related to innovation capacity
are associated with state success in the SBIR program over this same time period.
Implications for regional growth and development are briefly explored in Section 5.
2. Data
The U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Technology (1984-94)
compiles data on number and dollar value of SBIR awards made in each state in each
year by eleven federal agencies. 2  The Department of Defense, the federal agency with
the largest research and development budget, makes about half of all awards.  This
study uses figures for the number and value of awards from both Phase 1 and Phase 2
of the program.3  Nominal dollar values are converted to real ($1987) values using the
GDP price deflator.  Table 1 indicates that the program has grown substantially since
its inception.  In 1983, all participating agencies combined made 688 awards with a
real value of $51.7 million, whereas in 1993, 4016 awards were made totaling $567.5
million (in $1987).  Thus, the program has grown substantially over the years, it is not
large in dollar terms.  However, SBIR awards appear to play an important role in
certifying firm quality to venture capitalists and other private investors (Lerner 1999).
Table 2 shows that SBIR awards have been disproportionately concentrated
among firms in a few states, while firms in other states have had virtually no success
in the program at all.  This geographic pattern of awards holds year in and year out
and is only partly explained by state size.  Ordinary least squares regressions of the
mean number of awards (Aj) and mean real value of awards (in thousands of dollars)
(Vj) by state between 1983-93 on mean state population ( POPj) over this same time
period yields4
Aj = -14.21 + 0.014POPj + ej R2 = 0.478 (1)
       (-0.95)    (6.55)
Vj = -1857.6 + 1.74POPj + ej R2 = 0.458 (2)
        (-0.93)    (6.30)
Equations (1) and (2), show that while POPj is positively and significantly (t-statistics
are presented beneath coefficient estimates) related to Aj and Vj, it explains less than
half of the variation in both variables.  In other words, the interstate distribution of
awards is not simply coincident with the interstate distribution of people; thus,
additional factors appear to be at work in determining a state’s SBIR success rate.
The framework for identifying these factors must account for persistence of success
(or lack of success) among states as well as the growth of the program over the sample
period.
A portion of the remaining geographic variation in SBIR awards might be
explained by the fact that states operated programs over the sample period to identify
prospective applicants and to assist them with the proposal process. These programs,
which have been linked to research and development activity by Bania, Calkins, and
Dalenberg (1992) fall into three categories: (1) university-industry cooperative
research relationships, (2) SBIR assistance, and (3) technology extension and
deployment.  University-industry cooperative research relationships are established to
facilitate transfer of research results and personnel between academia and the private
sector.  By broadening communication between scientists and engineers, they may
encourage innovation and therefore could lead to greater SBIR success rates.  State
technology extension and deployment programs are aimed at encouraging the spread
and application of the latest technology to aid economic development.  These
programs make technical information, including SBIR application materials, available
through publications and computer databases. Also, staff members seek out potential
adopters of existing technology and provide technical assistance.  SBIR assistance
programs make small businesses aware of opportunities for funding, provide help with
proposal development, search for scientific and technical information, and facilitate
contact with experts outside the firm.  Rees (1991) and Berglund and Coburn (1995)
provide a more complete description of these programs.
Information on the years in which each state operated these programs are taken
from a survey conducted by Berglund and Coburn (1995, pp. 54-56), which covered
the period 1983-93.  Data on expenditures by these programs are not available for the
sample period, so dummy variables were created to indicate whether or not a state
operated a program in each of the three categories in each year. 5  The State of
Washington did not provide information about its programs and was excluded from
the analysis.  In any event, the data on program adoption show that the three types of
programs were relatively rare in 1983, but by the end of the sample period they were
widely available.  In 1983, 14% of states had university-industry cooperative research
programs, 4% had SBIR assistance programs, and 10% had technology extension and
deployment programs.  By 1993, the corresponding percentages were 47%, 53%, and
65%, respectively.  Additionally, no states had adopted all three programs until 1987,
but by 1993, 18% of states had done so.
3. Fixed Effects Analysis
Estimation of fixed effects models is a natural way to further analyze the
connection between the three types of programs just discussed and state success in the
SBIR program.  Data on the number and real value of SBIR awards by state over the
period 1983-93 form a balanced panel, in which heterogeneity among states and over
time can be controlled.  The model to be estimated is
AWARDjt=a+mj+lt+SkbkXkjt+SkgkZkj+ejt (3)
In equation (3), AWARDjt is the natural logarithm of either the absolute number
(NUMBER) or the real dollar value (MONEY) of SBIR awards (in thousands of 1987
dollars) received per thousand of population by state  j in year t.  Also, Xkjt denotes
explanatory variables that vary over both states and time (such as those measuring
state programs to attract SBIR funding) and Zkj denotes explanatory variables that time
invariant state characteristics.   bk and gk are coefficients to be estimated, mj and lt are
unobserved state- and time-specific effects, and ejt is an error term.  One-way fixed
effects estimation includes the state-specific effects ( mj) and suppresses the time-
specific effects (lt).  Two-way fixed effects estimation includes both types of effects.
Simultaneity between SBIR success and state programs to attract SBIR funding is a
possible problem because program adoption may be influenced by the quantity of
awards a state receives.  However, this problem may not be serious for two reasons.
First, as indicated previously, most states had adopted SBIR assistance programs by
the end of the sample period.  Second, the other two types of state programs have
broader missions than simply to provide SBIR assistance ( Berglund and Coburn
1995).6
Also in equation (3), dependent variables are transformed to natural logarithms
because changes in explanatory variables are more likely to exert a constant
percentage increase in awards across states than a constant absolute increase. 7  Also,
scaling both award measures by population controls for state size, which already has
been demonstrated to partly determine absolute levels of success in the SBIR
program.  Notice that including the state dummies ( mj) in the regression will sweep out
the Zkj.  Thus, effects of Zkj on SBIR success must be recovered in a separate analysis
(see below).
The fixed effects approach was used to estimate equation (3) for three
interrelated reasons.  First, it is a simple way to control for, yet avoid enumerating,
unique aspects of states, such as knowledge generation potential, as well as
heterogeneity over time that might be attributable to a general increase in awareness of
the SBIR program and to its expanding resources.  Second, random effects
specifications of equation (3), in which state- and time-specific effects are treated as
error components, are rejected by Hausman (1978) tests in the two-way fixed effects
case.8  Third, conditional estimates of effects of state economic development
programs on success in the SBIR program are thought to be of greater interest than
corresponding unconditional effects that would be obtained from a random effects
model.  Coefficients of the state program variables in equation (3) are broadly
interpreted as percentage changes in SBIR success, holding constant the net effects of
state- and/or time-specific factors (depending on whether the one-way or two-way
fixed effects model is estimated).
Explanatory variables included when estimating equation (3) (i.e., X) are
limited to dummy variables indicating whether a state operates university-industry
cooperative research programs, SBIR assistance programs, or technology extension
and deployment programs.  In the analysis described below, UI indicates whether a
state had a university-industry cooperative research program, ASSISTANCE indicates
whether a state had an SBIR assistance program, and EXTENSION indicates whether
a state operated a technology extension program.  Variables such as the education
level of the workforce, the proportion of scientists and engineers in the population, the
percentage of the workforce in high technology manufacturing, the number of
Research I universities, and other factors possibly related to SBIR success are treated
as part of Zjk.  This approach is not taken for three reasons.  First, these variables
exhibit more variation between states than within states.  Over the sample period, for a
given state, they change slowly if at all over time and are most appropriately thought
of as state characteristics that are swept out when mj is included in equation (3).  As
noted previously, however, the role of these variables is explicitly considered in the
analysis of mean SBIR success rates presented in the next section.  Second, as a
practical matter, these variables are not measured every year.  Third, it is of interest to
see whether the state program variables emerge as significant determinants of success
in the SBIR program when they have no competition from other X variables included
in the analysis.9
Table 3 presents both one-way and two-way fixed effects estimates of equation
(3) for NUMBER and MONEY together with means for the three explanatory
variables.10  Estimates are based on 539 observations (49 states x 11 years).  State-
specific variation in both dependent variables is significantly different from zero at the
1% level.11  Time-specific variation in both dependent variables is significantly
different from zero at the 1% level as well after removing state-specific and program
effects.12  Values of R2 range from 0.644 to 0.923.  Multicollinearity between the state
economic development program variables does not appear to be a problem because
the largest Pearson correlation between any two of the three variables is 0.31 and the
condition number of the moment matrix for these variables is 2.49.
One-way fixed effects estimates suggest that the presence of university-
industry cooperative research, SBIR assistance, and technology extension and
deployment programs lead to substantially greater numbers and dollar values of SBIR
awards.  Coefficients of the three program measures are positive and significantly
different from zero at conventional levels in both the equations for NUMBER and
MONEY.  For example, these estimates indicate that maintaining an SBIR assistance
program increases the per capita number of awards by about 31% and increases per
capita value of awards by about 59%.  Evaluated at sample means, these percentage
increases imply absolute increases in the number and value of awards by about 16 and
$3.58 million, respectively.  Estimated effects of university-industry cooperative
research programs are larger while those for technology extension programs are
smaller.  Thus, after controlling for net effects of state-specific variables such as
knowledge generation capacity as well as other factors, it appears that state economic
development programs are successful possibly either by encouraging more SBIR
applications or by increasing applicant success rates.
A rather different picture, however, emerges from the two-way fixed effects
estimates.  These equations suggest that state programs have no influence on SBIR
success rates.  Coefficients of the three state program variables are negative and do
not differ from zero at the 5% level under a two-tail test.  There is a simple
explanation for the contrasting implications from the one-way and two-way models.
As previously noted, over the 1983-93 period states adopted technology development
and assistance programs at a rapid pace.  At the same time, as noted in Section 2, real
resources distributed through the SBIR program increased by a factor of 10.  The two-
way fixed effects estimates control for the effect of SBIR program growth, while the
one-way fixed effects estimates do not.  Thus, the two-way fixed effects estimates are
more appropriate for estimating the marginal contribution of the state programs
holding the size of the SBIR program fixed over the sample period.  According to
these estimates, state programs had no effect on the number of awards that states
received.  Indeed, it is possible that these programs increase the overall number of
applicants to the SBIR program and may lead to an improvement in the overall quality
of proposals.  Yet, there is no evidence that they alter the interstate distribution of
awards.  In consequence, Section 4 considers other possible explanations for the
geographic distribution of SBIR awards.
4. Analysis of State-Specific Effects
If state economic development programs do not appreciably affect the
interstate distribution of SBIR awards, then what variables might represent a better
explanation?  The answer here rests on further analysis the state-specific effects in
equation (3).  These effects, presumably influenced by the level of innovative activity
in a state, can be recovered by manipulating equation (3) (see Henderson 1996 for
details) to obtain equation (4).
jkjkkj vcW +Zå+= g (4)
In equation (2), ××× å-= jkjkkjj AWARDSXbAWARDSW ,  denotes the time mean of
either NUMBER or MONEY (expressed in logarithms per capita), ×kjX  denotes the
time means of the state program variables, c is a constant equal to a  plus the average
of the ,, ×+= jjjt ev ml and the ×je are the time means of the residuals from the fixed
effects estimates of equation (3).  The dependent variable in equation (4), Wj, simply
nets out the year-to-year effects of economic development programs on SBIR award
levels from NUMBER and MONEY.  The gk coefficients in equation (4) are estimated
by a least squares regression of Wj on the Zkj.  Notice, however, that in equation (4),
the error term, vj,is composite and would be expected to exhibit heteroskedasticity.  In
consequence, standard errors of the least squares estimates of gk are corrected using
the method proposed by White (1980).  Also, a possible criticism of specification
shown in equation (4) is that they might be determined to some extent by the number
and dollar value of SBIR awards.  To reduce this potential endogeneity problem,
variables in Zjk are drawn to the extent practicable from a year just prior to the start of
the sample period.
Table 4 presents results from estimating equation (4).  Five explanatory
variables are used in the analysis to reflect different aspects of the level of innovative
activity in a state.  Similar variables have been used for this purpose in related studies
(see, for example, Audretsch and Feldman 1996).  HIGH-TECH denotes employment
of workers per thousand of population in six manufacturing sectors classified as
having the highest R&D intensity (Organization for Cooperation and Development
1995, see also the discussion of alternate classification schemes by Malecki 1997).
These sectors are drugs, office and computing machines, communications equipment,
electronic components and accessories, guided missiles and space vehicle parts, and
engineering and scientific instruments. 13  Notice that the level of employment in these
sectors also reflects the presence of industries oriented to national defense.  Because
of the U.S. Defense Department’s prominent role in the SBIR program, HIGH-TECH
is expected also to reflect the historical pattern of federal defense expenditures.  R&D
denotes research expenditures (in $000) at doctorate granting higher educational
institutions in a state per thousand of population in 1982 (National Science
Foundation 1984).  SCIENTISTS denotes the number persons employed as scientists
and engineers per thousand of population in 1980 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982).
RESEARCH 1 denotes the number of universities in a state, per thousand of
population, classified as Carnegie Research 1 institutions in 1984 ( Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1987).   COLLEGE denotes the
percentage of persons with four or more years of college in each state’s population in
1980 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982).
Means of explanatory variables are presented in the second column of Table 4
and regression results are presented in the third and fourth columns.  Regressions use
49 observations as the state of Washington is again excluded.  Multicollinearity does
not appear to be a serious problem because the largest Pearson correlation coefficient
among the set of explanatory variables is 0.56 and the condition number of the
moment matrix is 9.8.  Values of R 2 were 0.681 and 0.567 in the NUMBER and
MONEY equations, respectively.  Coefficients of explanatory variables are positive
and jointly significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
In Table 4, coefficients of HIGH-TECH, SCIENTISTS, and, RESEARCH 1 are
positive and significantly different at the 5% percent level or lower under a 1-tail test
in the equations for both NUMBER and MONEY.  The coefficient of COLLEGE is
positive and significantly different from zero at the 6% level under a 1-tail test in the
NUMBER equation and not significantly different from zero at conventional levels in
the equation for MONEY.  The coefficient of R&D is not significantly different from
zero at conventional levels in either equation.  Thus, R&D and COLLEGE, while
broadly measuring research capacity, do not appear to be indicators of where
commercial technology is developed.  Coefficients are interpreted as the percentage
change in AWARDS (NUMBER or MONEY) given a one-unit change in an explanatory
variable.  For example, if one more person per thousand of population is employed in
a state’s high-technology manufacturing sectors, the number of SBIR awards won per
thousand of population would rise by 5.4% and the amount of money attracted would
rise by 12.9%.
Table 5 presents calculations using mean values of relevant variables to further
illustrate the magnitude of these effects.  In particular, the table presents effects of
increasing HIGH-TECH, SCIENTISTS, and COLLEGE by one unit.  For the variables
HIGH-TECH and SCIENTISTS, this means an increase of one such person in a state
per thousand of population and for COLLEGE, it means increasing the fraction of
persons with four or more years of college by one percentage point.  Table 5 also
shows the effect on both of these dependent variables of increasing the number of
Research 1 universities in a state by one such university (e.g., not one such university
per thousand persons).  Elasticity estimates are presented as well, although a caveat
regarding interpretation of these values is that RESEARCH 1 is not a continuous
variable.14  Elasticity values are evaluated at the sample means of the relevant
variables.
These calculations show, for example, that the 5.4% increase in number of
awards occasioned by an increase in high technology employment by one person per
thousand of population increases the absolute number of awards in a state with
average population by about 3.  The value of SBIR awards in a state with average
population rises by about $778,000.  Also, increasing the per capita number of
scientists and engineers in a state appears to have a larger impact on SBIR funding
than does increasing high technology manufacturing employment.  In particular, the
elasticities of both NUMBER and MONEY with respect to SCIENTISTS exceed those
for HIGH-TECH. As previously noted, an increase in the percentage of college
educated people in a state’s population is associated with an increase in the number of
awards.  An additional Research 1 university in a state increases the number of awards
by 8.26 and increases the value of awards by $2.5 million.  Overall, results presented
in Tables 4 and 5 show that the number and value of SBIR awards are responsive to
variables measuring innovative activity, after removing effects of population and
publicly funded SBIR assistance programs.
5. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the geographic distribution of awards made through
the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.  This analysis began with an
attempt to explain this distribution by estimating a fixed effects model for state-level
data on per capita awards for the period 1983-93.  Measures of whether or not states
had adopted university-industry cooperative research programs, SBIR assistance
programs, or technology extension programs were used as independent variables.
These variables did not perform well in the two-way fixed effects case.  This outcome
may indicate that the effects of publicly funded assistance over the sample period
cannot be distinguished from the effects of an expansion in the size of the SBIR
program.  On the other hand, variables measuring employment in high technology
manufacturing, the percentage of population employed as scientists and engineers, and
the number of Carnegie Research 1 universities in a state were positively and
significantly associated with mean state SBIR success rates for the sample period.
Thus, after adjusting for population size, awards tend to be made to firms in centers of
innovative activity.  State assistance programs do not appear to have been an effective
tool in overcoming this seemingly powerful factor.
A possible implication of this result is that the SBIR program may confer an
unintended economic advantage to U.S. states that already have more highly
developed innovation capacity.  The central argument here is this: Knowledge
generation, the potential for knowledge spillovers between economic agents, and
innovation capacity are associated with greater rates of local economic growth
(Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Schleifer 1992 and Henderson, Kuncoro, and
Turner 1995).  Also, knowledge generation and innovation capacity tends to be
unevenly distributed over space and technical know-how is not readily transmitted
between geographic locations ( Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993 and Anselin,
Varga and Acs 1997).  Thus, because SBIR resources are disproportionately allocated
to commercial technology development in areas that already have the greatest capacity
for innovation, the program would appear to exacerbate interstate disparities in
economic growth rates.  Additionally, states with a well-developed capacity for
innovation that now receive the bulk of SBIR awards may wish to support further
extensions of the program when it comes up for renewal in the U.S. Congress.  On the
other hand, states currently receiving few awards have little to gain from further
extensions of the program, unless they are willing to make infrastructure investments
necessary to upgrade their capacity for innovation and knowledge creation.
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1Another factor to consider along these lines is whether a state’s political influence is
used to intervene in the selection of awardees.  Lerner (1999) contends that this
possibility may not be important because of the small size of awards, the fact that
awards are made by 11 different agencies, and the scoring systems used to rank
applicants largely focus on the technological merit of proposals.
2These reports also provide an overview of the SBIR program since 1982.
3Phase 1 awards are made for research projects to evaluate the scientific and technical
merit of an idea.  Phase 2 awards are made for further development of selected Phase
1 projects that demonstrate greatest potential.  The program also includes a third phase
in which commercialization occurs.  However, no SBIR funding may be used for
Phase 3.
4Mean values of these variables were computed for each state over the 1983-93
period.
5The survey attempted to obtain FY1994 expenditures for each program category in
each state.  However, in many cases, states were unable to provide expenditure values
because program activities were conducted by an economic development agency with
a broader mission.
6Nevertheless, a complete analysis of simultaneity still would be worthwhile.  This
analysis, however, requires building a more complete model of the determinants of
state technology program adoption.  This broader framework is beyond the scope of
this study and is left for further research.
7A few states in some years received no awards.  As a consequence, the dependent
variables, NUMBER and MONEY, were created after adding one to each observation.
This procedure permitted the transformation to logarithms and preserved the interstate
differences in awards seen in the raw data.
8Hausman (1978) test statistics on the one-way random effects estimates of the
equations reported in Table 3 are 8.53 and 4.49 for NUMBER and MONEY,
respectively.  P-values for these statistics are 0.036 and 0.213.  For the two-way
random effects estimates, the corresponding test statistics are 17.94 and 15.85 for
NUNBER and MONEY, respectively.  P-values for these statistics are less than 0.01 in
both cases.
9Notice that net effects of all state-specific effects are controlled by one-way fixed
effects analysis and that net effects of all state- and time-specific effects are controlled
by two-way fixed effects analysis.  Consequently, an omitted variable problem may be
less serious than it might first appear.
10Variables measuring interactions between programs also were tried in specifications
not reported here.  These interaction variables were significant determinants of SBIR
success rates in the one-way fixed effects models; however, their coefficients never
were significantly different from zero at conventional levels in the two-way models.
Thus, to economize on space, only the most parsimonious specifications are reported
here.  Also, another issue investigated turns on whether state programs might lead or
lag SBIR success.  In the specifications tried, however, addition of time controls
always destroyed the significance of the state program variables.
11In the one-way fixed effects estimates for NUMBER, the F-statistic for significance
of the state-specific effects is F(48,489)=41.53 and the corresponding F-statistic in the
one-way fixed effects MONEY equation is F(48,489)=15.50.  In the one-way fixed
effects equation for NUMBER, the F-statistic for testing the joint significance of the
program variables after removing state-specific controls is F(3,488)=35.05.  The
corresponding F-statistic from the MONEY equation is F(3,488)=18.81.
12In the two-way fixed effects estimates of the NUMBER equation, the F-statistic for
testing the joint significance of time controls after removing state and program effects
is F(10,477)=52.44.  The corresponding F-statistic in the MONEY equation is
F(10,477)=28.738.
13These are sectors 283, 357, 366, 367, 376, 381 in the U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1986).
14Calculations of effects of RESEARCH 1 implicitly assumes that all such universities
are “perfectly divisible” in order to give partial derivatives with respect to this
variable the usual interpretation.
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TABLE 1
NUMBER AND VALUE OF SBIR AWARDS
1983-93
Fiscal Year Total Number of SBIR Awards Total Current $-Value of
SBIR Awards (in million $)
Total-Constant 1987
$-value (in million $)
1983 688 45 51.7
1984 1313 108 118.8
1985 1804 199 211.0
1986 2509 298 306.9
1987 2955 351 351
1988 2732 389 375.5
1989 2866 432 399.3
1990 3229 461 411.6
1991 3313 483 413.9
1992 3473 508 423.0
1993 4016 698 567.5
Sources: U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Technology (1984-1994) and Berglund and Coburn
(1995)
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF SBIR AWARDS BY STATE:
1983-93
State Total Number of
SBIR Awards
Share in Total
Number of SBIR
Awards (in %)
Total 1987 $-
Value of SBIR
Awards (in
thousands)
Share in Total $-
Value of SBIR
Awards (in %)
Alabama 442 1.44 53121 1.6
Alaska 32 0.10 654. 0.0
Arizona 370 1.21 39573 1.2
Arkansas 47 0.15 3741 0.1
California 6774 22.07 803922 24.0
Colorado 1354 4.41 108702 3.2
Connecticut 894 2.91 103656 3.1
Delaware 87 0.28 9763 0.3
Florida 653 2.13 75903 2.3
Georgia 216 0.70 20872 0.6
Hawaii 84 0.27 10209 0.3
Idaho 29 0.09 2846 0.1
Illinois 498 1.62 58736 1.8
Indiana 177 0.58 20045 0.6
Iowa 66 0.22 5906 0.2
Kansas 57 0.19 4610 0.1
Kentucky 39 0.13 3727 0.1
Louisiana 105 0.34 8585 0.3
Maine 333 1.09 9888 0.3
Maryland 1652 5.38 175362  5.2
Massachusetts 4571 14.89 555506 16.6
Michigan 504 1.64 54805 1.6
Minnesota 412 1.34 42333 1.3
Mississippi 44 0.14 2609 0.1
Missouri 133 0.43 13438 0.4
Montana 55 0.18 4977 0.1
Nebraska 77 0.25 5935 0.2
Nevada 70 0.23 10927 0.3
New Hampshire 296 0.96 38076 1.1
New Jersey 849 2.77 96132 2.9
New Mexico 650 2.12 74231 2.2
New York 1365 4.45 137978 4.1
North Carolina 335 1.09 41757 1.2
North Dakota 86 0.28 1607 0.0
Ohio 903 2.94 80731 2.5
Oklahoma 103 0.34 10126 0.3
Oregon 380 1.24 39597 1.2
Pennsylvania 1161 3.78 130257 3.9
Rhode Island 87 0.28 8525 0.3
South Carolina 21 0.07 1392 0.0
South Dakota 7 0.02 484 0.0
Tennessee 357 1.16 41629 1.2
Texas 974 3.17 101106 3.0
Utah 506 1.65 52358 1.6
Vermont 172 0.56 6677 0.2
Virginia 1611 5.25 169035 5.0
Washington* 754 2.46 76188 2.3
West Virginia 19 0.06 5190 0.2
Wisconsin 157 0.51 17990 0.5
Wyoming 5 0.02 355 0.0
Source: U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Technology (1984-1994) and Berglund and Coburn (1995).
*denotes state excluded from the regression analyses.
TABLE 3a
STATE PROGRAMS AND SBIR AWARDS
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE
NUMBER MONEY
MEAN ONE-WAY TWO-WAY ONE-WAY TWO-WAY
CONSTANT --- --- -5.189
(-161.66)
--- -0.865
(-8.69)
UI 0.32 0.407
(4.88)
-0.013
(-0.215)
0.680
(3.11)
-0.154
(-0.80)
ASSISTANCE 0.23 0.309
(4.24)
-0.038
(-0.67)
0.594
(3.10)
-0.042
(-0.24)
EXTENSION 0.33 0.281
(4.05)
-0.064
(-1.18)
0.334
(1.84)
-0.297
(-1.78)
SUMMARY STATISTICS
NT 539 539 539 539
R2 0.838 0.923 0.644 0.778
at-statistics shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates
TABLE 4a
DETERMINANTS OF ADJUSTED MEAN AWARDS
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE
MEAN NUMBER MONEY
CONSTANT --- -2.558
(-4.88)
-2.013
(-2.17)
HIGH-TECH 5.64 0.058
(2.88)
0.129
(3.06)
R & D 32.88 0.003
(0.44)
-0.006
(-0.55)
SCIENTISTS 8.40 0.103
(2.91)
0.150
(1.67)
RESEARCH 1 0.250 E-03 761.07
(2.32)
2000.9
(3.78)
COLLEGE 16.05 0.068
(1.62)
-0.020
(-0.26)
SUMMARY
STATISTICS
N 49 49
R2 0.681 0.567
at-statistics shown in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates
TABLE 5
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN EXPLANTORY VARIABLES
EXPLANATORY
VARIABLE
NUMBER MONEY
ONE UNIT
INCREASE
ELASTICITY ONE-UNIT
INCREASE
ELASTICITY
HIGH-TECHb 2.90 0.30 $778,000 0.73
R & D ---a ---a ---a ---a
SCIENTISTSb 5.47 0.82 $905,000 1.26
RESEARCH 1c 8.26 0.19 $2,467,000 0.50
COLLEGE 3.61 1.09 ---a ---a
acoefficients of variable not significantly different from zero (see Table 4)
bone-unit increase represents a one-unit increase per thousand of population
cone-unit increase represents an increase of one Research 1 university
